Financial markets and uncertainty by anonymous
"Financiers live in a world of illusion," said
George Bernard Shaw, and never has this been
truer than in the past decade, when everything
has had to be viewed through the prism of infla-
tion. But financiers also deal with the very real
world of the marketplace, and the resulting con-
flicts between reality and inflationary illusions
have led to serious distortions in various seg-
ments of the market and in broad monetary re-
lationships. The 1970's thus have developed
into a decade of financial uncertainty, unlike
any decade since the 1930's.
The four papers in this issue discuss the re-
sponses to increased uncertainty occurring in
four separate financial markets-the mortgage
market, the debt market, the equity market, and
tlle money market. The responses may differ in
each case-for example, an institutional re-
sponse in the mortgage market and a market
response in the debt market-but all represent
aspects of a general attempt to compensate for
uncertainty in financial markets.
George Kaufman examines some of the struc-
tural changes brought about by inflationary un-
certainty in the imperfectly functioning mort-
gage market. He compares the conventional
fixed interest rate mortgage (FRM) with an
alternative mortgage plan containing a variable
rate (VRM), and shows how the latter has de-
veloped as a response to the uncertainty facing
lenders and borrowers of long-term mortgage
credit.
The industry, faced with an inflationary en-
vironment, has created the VRM in order to
reduce the financial pressures on mortgage-
lending intermediaries, to increase the flow of
funds through the mortgage market, and to
stimulate the purchase of additional housing.
Kaufman describes how the VRM breaks the
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link between long maturity and high risk asso-
ciated with uncertainty regarding future interest
rates-two characteristics which the traditional
FRM mortgage contract combines. By decoupl-
ing the current interest charge from the future
interest rate, the risks surrounding future inter-
est cost are transferred-all or in part-from
the lender to the borrower. With lenders feeling
a lower risk they will be more willing to under-
take mortgage financing. The lowered risk
should also mean that a VRM will have a lower
expected cost to the borrower over the life of
the mortgage than an equivalent FRM.
In Kaufman's view, "The VRM is a complex
instrument, much more complex than first anal-
ysis would suggest, and there is good evidence
that it is not yet fully understood by any of the
parties concerned-borrowers, lenders or reg-
ulators." The recent experience of seven Cali-
fornia financial institutions suggests that the
VRM can operate successfully, but only under
certain specific conditions. "The California ex-
perience to date suggests that it may not be easy
to realize the full potential of this mortgage
instrument."
Joseph Bisignano, in a second paper, analyzes
the bond market's response to the uncertainty
created by unanticipated inflation. The market
has experienced not only a dramatic rise in
yields on long-term debt securities, but also a
change in the spreads between different grades
of corporate and municipal bonds, and in the
spreads between yields on prime-grade cor-
porates and yields on long-term Government
securities. This raises the question whether the
market has been "efficient" in establishing yield
differentials of this type.
Bisignano's response is that the market has
been efficient in removing any systematic profitsavailable by arbitraging across different grades
of securities-for example, between Aaa and
Baa bonds-but that it has not been efficient
in establishing the differential between prime-
grade corporates and long-term Government
bonds. "The difficulty in determining this
spread appears to be related to the unprece-
dented rise in unanticipated inflation experi-
enced since the late 1960's." Unanticipated in-
flation has caused the market to demand much
greater premiums for prime corporates over
Governments than the underlying risk would
have justified. Long-term Governments appar-
ently have lost some of their role as a "safe
asset" in long-term portfolios, and this has im-
paired the market's ability to determine the
appropriate spread between the two types of
bonds.
Herbert Runyon analyzes the shifting rela-
tionships of debt and equity in corporate bal-
ance sheets, under the spur of inflation and in-
creased uncertainty. These changes, he says,
can be viewed as a matter of corporate treas-
urers trying to find the best mix of equity and
debt in response to the uncertainty of the past
decade.
Manufacturing corporations financed them-
selves rather conservatively until about the mid-
1960's, but then began to expand the debt in
their balance sheets in an attempt to increase
the rate of return on equity shares. For a while
they were successful, widening the spread be-
tween the return on equity and the return on
assets. "This was altogether in tune with the
temper of the Sixties, when performance was
the name of the game and the bottom line took
precedence." Butthen a day of reckoning came
in the 1970's, when highly leveraged firms be-
came increasingly exposed to higher market in-
terest rates and to cyclical fluctuations in cor-
porate earnings.
Corporate treasurers seem now to have re-
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thoughtthe virtues ofhigh leverageratios. There
have been no increases in leverage in recent
years, following a period of steady rise toward
more risky financing in the late 1960's. Recent
emphasis on cash flow suggests a return to a
lower mixture of debt to equity finance. To the
extent that external financing is required in the
future, it is likely to be met with greater stock
market financing and less reliance on bonds and
and on bank borrowing.
Rose McElhattan's paper considers the puz-
zling overforecast ofmoney growth which econ-
omists' money demand relationships have pro-
duced since mid-1974, thus demonstrating how
a useful money-market equation can go astray
in an era of uncertainty. She points out that
forecast money growth was about twice as great
as actual money growth for the first year of the
currentrecovery-afinding which throws doubt
on the ability of standard models of the U.S.
economy to forecast GNP. But after examining
the GNP forecast errors developed in a large
quarterly econometric model, she concludes
that the current relation between money and
income has remained similar to its past be-
havior.
McElhattan examines several alternative ex-
planations for this situation, the most persua-
sive one being that the public's demand for
money has not really changed. In other words,
the observed errors may be the fault of the mis-
specification of the equation used to predict the
public's actual demand for money. But although
this provides a plausible explanation of the
equation's erratic behavior, a good portion of
the overforecast remains unexplained. Uncer-
tainty appears to be at the root of the problem.
In the real economy, for example, the recent
business decline-the steepest of the past gen-
eration-was much worse than expected, and
thus generated enough uncertainty to destabilize
traditional money-demand relationships.